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Abstract
The principle of proportionality applies to competition proceedings especially, when 
it comes to the exercise by the competition authority of its powers of inspection. 
Their use limits the economic freedom and right to privacy of the scrutinised 
undertakings in order to protect free competition. The use of inspection powers 
must thus be proportionate and remain the least onerous possible for the inspected 
companies. In consequence, legislation must provide procedural guarantees of 
proportionality of inspections.
This article analyses whether the powers of inspection bestowed upon the Polish 
competition authority are regulated in a way that guarantees the observance of 
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the principle of proportionality. The analysis focuses on the powers of control and 
search. Subsequently covered is also the issue of judicial control over the use of 
the powers of inspection by the competition authority. Proposals for changes in 
the practice of the competition authority as well as in the Polish legal framework 
are made in conclusion. 
Résumé 
Le principe de la proportionnalité s’applique quand il vient à l’exercice des puissances 
de l’inspection par l’autorité de concurrence. L’utilisation de ces puissances – limitant, 
au nom de la protection de la libre concurrence, la liberté économique et le droit 
des entreprises à l’intimité – doit être proportionnée et la moins onéreuse possible 
pour les entreprises inspectées. Par conséquent, dans le cadre juridique les garanties 
procédurales de la proportionnalité des inspections doivent être fournies. L’article 
analyse si les puissances des inspections de l’autorité de concurrence polonaise sont 
réglées d’une manière qui garantit le respect du principe de la proportionnalité.
Classifications and key words: competition proceedings; antitrust proceedings; 
dawn raids; inspection; right to privacy; right of defense; judicial control over the 
administrative proceedings; procedural fairness.
I. Introduction
Proportionality is an essential legal principle which states that interference 
by public authorities with the rights and freedoms of private entities is 
permissible only if it is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society for the protection of key interests such as public order or 
the rights and freedoms of others. For that reason, the use of public measures 
in order to attain objectives legitimately pursued by legislation should remain 
the least onerous possible for private entities. Actions of the State will be 
disproportional if the same aim can be achieved in a less intrusive way.
The principle of proportionality is useful when analysing competition 
proceedings. Competition authorities act for the protection of free competition 
on the market and ultimately, for consumer welfare1. There is no doubt that 
these interests can be a reason for limitations being placed on the economic 
freedom of undertakings as well as their right to privacy. Competition 
authorities, including the Polish President of the Office of Competition 
and Consumers Protection (in Polish: Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i 
Konsumentów; hereafter, UOKiK President), have major powers of inspection. 
1 R. Whish, Competition Law, 6th ed., Lexis Nexis, London 2009, p. 1 and p. 19.
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Their use, limiting the economic freedom and right to privacy of undertakings 
in the name of competition protection objectives, should be proportionate2.
This article analyses if the powers of inspection granted to the UOKiK 
President by the Competition Act are formulated so as to guarantee the 
observance of the principle of proportionality. Problematic issues in this 
respect are discussed. Attention is drawn to the powers of control and searches 
covered by Articles 105a-105l of the Act of 16 July 2007 on Competition and 
Consumers Protection (the Competition Act)3. The article deals also with 
judicial control over the use of the powers of inspection by the competition 
authority. In conclusion, proposals for changes in the interpretation of the 
current legal framework are made. Suggested are also certain amendments 
of the Competition Act. Due to its limitations, the article does not deal with 
powers of inspection concerning private premises nor with inspections run 
by the UOKiK President under authorization of the European Commission.
II. Limitations of rights and freedoms
The principle of proportionality derives in the Polish legal system from 
Article 2, as a consequence of the democratic state of law clause, and Article 
31(3) of the Constitution of 19974. According to the latter rule, a limitation 
upon the exercise of constitutional rights and freedoms may be imposed only 
by statute, and only when necessary in a democratic State for the protection of 
its security or public order, to protect the environment, health or public morals, 
or the rights and freedoms of others. Such limitations shall not however violate 
the essence of specific rights and freedoms. Interference with the economic 
freedom and interests of companies [Article 64(1) of the Constitution] is thus 
allowed only if it meets the requirements of Article 31(3) of the Constitution. 
According to Article 22 of the Constitution, limitations upon the freedom of 
economic activity may be imposed only by means of a statute and only for 
important public reasons.
Inspections run by the UOKiK President interfere with the right to privacy 
of the scrutinised companies (right to respect its premises). Taken into 
consideration when assessing if an inspection is proportionate, must be the 
standards of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
2 Compare in this respect 46/87 Hoechst AG v Commission, ECR [1989] 2859, para. 19. See 
also C-94/00 Roquette Freres SA, ECR [2002] I-9011, para. 80.
3 Journal of Laws 2007 No. 50, item 337.
4 Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws 1997 No. 78, 
item 483).
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which guarantees the right to privacy. The ECHR is binding and directly 
applicable in Poland5. Consequently, all Polish public authorities including the 
UOKiK President are under the obligation to observe the ECHR.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) confirmed directly in the 
field of competition law procedure that Article 8 ECHR protects undertakings 
against arbitrary inspections by competition authorities. The ECtHR noted in 
Société Colas Est and Others v France6 that even if the scale of the steps taken 
by the French competition authority in order to prevent the disappearance or 
concealment of evidence of anti-competitive practices justified the interference 
with the applicant’s right to respect its premises, law and practice had not afforded 
the inspected company adequate and effective safeguards against power abuse. 
The ECtHR pointed out that the French competition authority had extensive 
powers of inspection which gave it an exclusive competence to determine the 
expediency, number, length and scale of inspections. Moreover, inspections were 
carried out without a prior warrant from a judge and without a senior police 
officer being present. The ECtHR accepted at the same time however that the 
entitlement of State authorities to interfere with the rights protected by Article 
8 if the ECHR may be more far-reaching where the business premises of a legal 
person are concerned7. It concluded nevertheless, having regard for the manner 
of the proceedings in the case in question, that impugned inspections cannot be 
regarded as strictly proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued8.
The principle of proportionality is also recognised by EU law as one of 
its general principles. Article 5(4) of the Treaty on European Union9 clearly 
specifies that under the principle of proportionality, the content and form 
of EU actions shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives 
of the Treaties. This stance is also confirmed by jurisprudence. In C-133/92 
Crispoltoni, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that the principle of 
proportionality requi res that measures adopted by Community institutions do 
not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain 
the objectives legitimately pursued by the EU law in question10. If a choice 
exists between several appropriate measures, the least onerous one must be 
used and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims 
 5 See Article 91(1) in conjunction with Article 9 of the Constitution.
 6 Application no. 37971/97, judgment of 16 April 2002, see para. 48-49.
 7 See also Niemietz v Germany, application no. 13710/88, judgement of 16 December 1992, 
para. 31.
 8 See also other ECtHR judgments in which the proportionality of inspections was assessed 
– Funke v France, application no. 10828/84, judgment of 25 February 1993, para. 55-57; Crémieux 
v France, application no. 11471/85, judgment of 25 February 1993, para. 38-40; Miailhe v France, 
application no. 12661/87, judgement of 25 February 1993, para. 36-38.
 9 OJ [2010] C 83/13.
10 C-133/93 Crispoltoni v Fattoria Autonoma Tabacchi, ECR [1994] I-4863, para. 40.
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pursued11. The ECJ held also that any intervention by public authorities in 
the sphere of anyone’s private activities, be it a natural or legal person, must 
have a legal basis and be justified on the grounds laid down by the law12. 
Consequently, protection against arbitrary or disproportionate intervention 
must be ensured by legislative means13.
EU courts identified procedural safeguards to be provided with respect to 
inspections run by the European competition authority – the Commission. It 
has been concluded that the Commission must, before starting an inspection, 
be able to specify its extent and goal14, especially by describing the facts that it 
wishes to establish through it15. Therefore, it should have prior to the inspection 
significant knowledge that a possible violation of EU competition law may 
have taken place16. Moreover, the inspected undertaking must be informed 
about the reasons for the inspection before it is started. Such information is 
crucial for the right of defence of those subject to an inspection. In addition, 
coercive measures used in its course should be neither arbitrary nor excessive 
having regard to the subject matter of the inspection17.
Taking all this into account it can be concluded that the economic freedom and 
the right to privacy of undertakings can indeed be legitimately limited as a result 
of an inspection run by competition authorities. However, such a limitation is 
permissible only if procedural safeguards are put in place and only if the goal of 
the inspection cannot be achieved with the use of less intrusive methods.
III. Proportionality safeguards in Polish competition proceedings
According to Polish competition law, the UOKiK President can run 
inspections in two ways: an ordinary inspection known as a control (Article 
105a of the Competition Act, in Polish: kontrola, hereafter called a control) 
and; an inspection that includes a search of the premises and belongings of 
the undertaking (Article 105c of the Competition Act, in Polish: kontrola 
11 Ibidem. 
12 Hoechst AG v Commission, para. 19.
13 Ibidem.
14 Ibidem, para. 29 and T-23/09 CNOP and CCG v Commission, not yet reported, para. 34.
15 136/79 National Panasonic v Commission, ECR [1980] 2033, para. 13, 21; see also 
H. Andersson, E. Legnerfärt, ‘Dawn Raids in sector inquiries – fishing expeditions in disguise’ 
(2008) 29(8) ECLR 441.
16 Ibidem.
17 See Article 20(8) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the 
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 
[2003] L 1/1.
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z przeszukaniem; hereafter called a search). When it comes to a control, 
inspectors are entitled to study materials provided on their request by the 
employees of the scrutinised undertaking. During a search, inspectors are 
entitled to look actively for proofs of the alleged infringement without the 
cooperation of the employees of the inspected undertaking.
The Competition Act contains some provisions that safeguard the 
proportionality of inspections run by the UOKiK President. First, both 
ordinary controls and searches can be run only in the field of the proceedings 
to which they belong to [Article 105a(1) in fine of the Competition Act]. There 
must therefore be a direct link between the inspection (a control or a search) 
and the subject matter of the proceedings. This means that there ought to be 
a link between the alleged objections or objection already raised against the 
undertaking and the scope of the inspection18. In consequence, items to which 
inspectors had access to during a control or search should not be taken into 
consideration or seized (under Article 105g of the Competition Act) unless 
they are related to the subject matter of the actual proceedings19. A need to 
run an inspection shall be supported by evidence already in the possession of 
the UOKiK President before its commencement.
Another procedural safeguard set out in the Competition Act is the 
obligation for the inspectors to deliver an authorisation issued by the UOKiK 
President, which specifies the extent of the given control, to the representatives 
of the undertaking subject to that control. According to Article 105a(1) of 
the Competition Act, an authorisation to carry out a control must contain: 
designation of the inspection authority; indication of the relevant legal basis; 
date and location of issue of the authorisation; inspectors’ data; designation 
of the entity to be inspected; determination of the object and scope of the 
inspection; determination of the inspection starting and expected end date; 
signature of the authorisation granting individual; instructions on the rights 
and obligations of the entity being inspected. With respect to a search, handed 
in must be an equivalent court order permitting it to start.
Any undertaking can become subject to an inspection under the Competition 
Act20. Grounds for the limitation of the freedom of economic activity are 
stronger however with respect to those suspected, even informally during 
explanatory proceedings, to have infringed competition rules. Inspections 
should thus concern alleged offenders first rather than those not believed to 
have breached competition law. Only if proofs of the infringement cannot be 
18 In this respect compare T-39/90 SEP v Commission, ECR [1991] II-1497, para. 29.
19 M. Swora, [in:] Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów, Komentarz, T. Skoczny, 
A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds), Warszawa 2009, Art. 105b, No. 12.
20 C. Banasiński, E. Piontek (eds), Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz, 
Warszawa 2009, p. 841.
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found at the premises of the alleged offender can an inspection be carried out 
at the premises of non-suspects (for example their competitors or distributors).
IV. The distinction between a control and a search
The fact that the Competition Act distinguished between a control and a 
search makes Polish solutions different to EU law where inspections run under 
Article 20 of Regulation 1/2003 include, automatically, the power of search21.
This distinction creates practical problems in Poland since procedural 
safeguards circumscribing the powers of the UOKiK President are more 
limited with respect to controls (ordinary inspections) than they are with 
respect to searches. The authority does not need judicial consent to carry 
out a control, unlike to start a search. Moreover, a control is merely based 
on a written authorisation handed in to the representatives of the inspected 
undertaking by the inspectors – UOKiK employees. The authorisation 
issued by the UOKiK President does not take the form of an order22 in the 
sense of Article 123 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (in Polish: 
Kodeks Postępowania Administracyjnego; hereafter, KPA)23. The inspected 
undertaking is thus deprived of the right to contest before a court the legality 
and proportionality of such an informal decision authorising the control of 
its premises. This situation takes place despite the fact that companies are 
obliged to cooperate with the UOKiK inspectors during a control and cannot 
deny them access to premises. Entry denial or lack of cooperation can in fact 
cause the imposition of a fine of up to 50 000 000 Euro [Article 106(2)(3) 
of the Competition Act]24. By contrast, a decision concerning an inspection 
21 ECJ held in Hoechst AG v Commission, para. 27, that the right of the Commission to 
enter any premises, land and means of transport of undertakings would serve no useful purpose 
if the Commission’s officials could do no more than ask for documents or files which they 
could precisely identify in advance. On the contrary, in the opinion of the ECJ, such right 
implies the power to search for various items of information which are not already known or 
fully identified; without such power, it would be impossible for the Commission to obtain the 
information necessary to carry out the investigation if the undertakings concerned refused to 
cooperate or adopted an obstructive attitude.
22 See the opinion of R. Janusz in this respect, ‘Dostosowywanie prawa polskiego do prawa 
wspólnotowego w zakresie instytucji, procedur i sankcji antymonopolowych’, [in:] P. Saganek, 
T. Skoczny (eds), Wybrane problemy i obszary dostosowania prawa polskiego do prawa Unii, 
Warszawa 1999, p. 292.
23 Act of 14 June 1960 – Code of Administrative Procedure (Journal of Laws 1960 No. 30, 
item 168, as amended).
24 A fine was recently imposed on undertakings in the UOKiK President’s decision of 4 
November 2010, DOK-9/2010 and the decision of 24 February 2011, DOK-1/2011. See M. Kozak, 
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issued under Article 20(4) Regulation 1/2003 – a decision that the undertaking 
must submit to – can be appealed to EU courts by the inspected undertaking25.
Despite the procedural distinction between controls and searches, the 
difference in the way they are run in practice may turn out rather minor. 
The Competition Act fails to define either of the two forms of inspections. 
Jurisprudence has pointed out that a search takes place when the inspectors 
run it independently from the representatives of the company concerned, 
without their cooperation and help26. During a search, inspectors are entitled 
to look actively for proofs of the alleged infringement rather than only, as is the 
case with respect to a control, to study the material provided by the employees 
of the scrutinised undertaking. However, since controls can be performed 
even without the presence in the premises of the company representative27, 
procedural safeguards do not exist to stop a control from becoming a search. 
This very problem has become the basis for a dispute between a specific 
undertaking that was subject to a control and the UOKiK President. The 
company in question refused to cooperate with the inspectors (computer files 
were not made available to them) claiming that the officials were conducting a 
search, rather than a control. A fine was thus imposed upon that undertaking 
by the UOKiK President, later to be upheld by the courts28.
A search is more intrusive than a control with respect to an undertaking’s 
freedom of economic activity and right to privacy. It should thus be used in 
exceptional cases only when the UOKiK President is unable to obtain sought 
after documents or when the undertaking in question fails to cooperation with 
the inspectors29. A search may only be performed if there is a high probability 
that the documents the competition authority wishes to get hold of cannot be 
‘Simple procedural infraction or a serious obstruction of antitrust proceedings, are fines in the 
region of 30-million EURO justified?Case comment to the decisions of the President of the 
Office for Competition and Consumer Protection of 4 November 2010 Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa 
Sp. z o.o. (DOK-9/2010) and of 24 February 2011 Polkomtel SA (DOK-1/2011)’ (2011) 4(5) 
YARS.
25 See also Hoechst AG v Commission, para. 26. A complaint to EU courts does not suspend 
the inspection.
26 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 7 May 2004, III SK 34/04, UOKiK Official Journal 
2004 No. 4, item 330; the judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 
11 August 2003, XVII Ama 123/02.
27 Article 80(2)(3) of the Act of 2 July 2004 on the Freedom of Economic Activity (Journal 
of Laws No. 173, item 1807, as amended) provides in the case of competition proceedings an 
exception from general rules which state that the presence during a control of the representative 
of the undertaking is obligatory.
28 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 7 May 2004, III SK 34/04. See also the judgement 
of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 11 August 2003, XVII Ama 123/02.
29 E. Modzelewska-Wąchal, Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz, 
Warszawa 2002, p. 228; M. Swora, [in:] Skoczny, Jurkowska, Miąsik (eds), Ustawa…, Art. 105c, 
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obtained in a different, less intrusive manner (especially by way of a simple 
information request under Article 50 of the Competition Act)30 or when there 
is suspicion that the undertaking will hide, destroy or alter them unless a 
search is carried out31. As the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure32 
are applicable per analogiam to searches run by the UOKiK President33, for 
a search to be started, a high probability must exist that proofs of the alleged 
infringement will be found in the given premises (Article 219 § 1 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure)34.
V. Prior notice of an inspection
Another issue that poses questions about proportionality in Polish 
competition proceedings is whether it is true that only unexpected can be 
deemed effective. Under the standards of EU law, an unannounced inspection 
is considered to be proportionate if it is justified in the given case35. Competition 
authorities must be able to search for various items of information which are 
not already known to them or fully identified36. Polish courts also accept that 
control can be run without prior notice37. 
In the light of the principle of proportionality, an unannounced control 
should be seen as an exception rather than the rule. Unfortunately, the 
Polish Act on the Freedom of Economic Activity38 provides in this respect 
that, specifically in the case of competition proceedings, undertakings are not 
given notice of a planned control [Article 79(2)(4)]. This provision constitutes 
therefore an exception from the general rule of the prior announcement of 
No 2; B. Turno, ‘Komentarz do Art. 105c’, [in:] A. Stawicki, E. Stawicki E. (eds), Ustawa 
o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz, Warszawa 2011, p. 1071.
30 Por. B. Turno, ‘Komentarz….,’ [in:] A. Stawicki, E. Stawicki E. (eds), Ustawa..., p. 1071; 
K. Róziewicz-Ładoń, Postępowanie przed Prezesem Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów 
w zakresie przeciwdziałania praktykom ograniczającym konkurencję, Warszawa 2011, p. 275.
31 C. Banasiński, E. Piontek (eds), Ustawa…, pp. 868-869.
32 Act of 6 June 1997 – Code of Criminal Procedure (Journal of Laws 1997 No. 89, item 
555, as amended.
33 See Article 105c(4) of the Competition Act.
34 E. Modzelewska-Wąchal, Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji..., p. 228; M. Swora, [in:] 
T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds), Ustawa…, Art. 105c, No 9.
35 National Panasonic v Commission, para. 30.
36 Hoechst AG v Commission, par.a 27.
37 Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 16 December 1998, XVII Ama 62/98, (2000) 
4 Wokanda.
38 Act of 2 July 2004 on the Freedom of Economic Activity (Journal of Laws No 173, item 
1807, as amended).
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controls [Article 79(1)]. The existence of a general statutory rule excluding 
prior notice in competition law proceedings is excessive. It is likely that a 
forewarning may in many situations undermine the possibility of finding proofs 
of the competition law infringement. Unlike searches however, controls are 
based on cooperation between the undertaking and inspectors. They therefore 
tend to focus on the physical examination of facts already known to the 
authority. Indeed, a control can also concern those not suspected of a violation. 
At least in such cases, controls should be carried out only if the undertaking 
in question has been duly informed about it. The UOKiK President should 
decide on the issue of prior notification on a case by case basis – statutory 
provisions should thus not generally preclude the competition authority from 
issuing a forewarning of an inspection.
VI. Inspections during explanatory proceedings
Proceedings before the UOKiK President can take the form of explanatory 
or full competition proceedings (officially called antimonopoly proceedings 
in the Polish Competition Act). Under Article 48(1) of the Competition Act, 
the UOKiK President can institute explanatory proceedings if circumstances 
indicate that it is likely that the provisions of the Competition Act had been 
infringed39. Article 48(2) of the Competition Act states that explanatory 
proceedings may, in particular40, aim at (1) initially determining whether 
an infringement took place of the provisions of the Competition Act which 
would justify the institution of antimonopoly proceedings41; (2) a study of 
the market, including the determination of the structure and degree of 
concentration thereof; (3) initially determining whether an obligation exists 
to submit a notification of an intended concentration. There are no parties to 
explanatory proceedings – objections against undertakings are not yet raised 
at this stage. Companies are not informed about the start of explanatory 
proceedings even if the actions of the UOKiK President undertaken therein 
39 Other reasons are: need to examine a given branch of economy, or as to matters regarding 
the protection of consumer interests, and in any other cases as provided for by the Competition 
Act. 
40 The list of grounds for establishing explanatory proceedings is not exhaustive.
41 In the field of consumer law explanatory proceedings can also aim at (1) initially 
determining whether there was an infringement of the provisions of the Competition Act, 
such as may justify the institution of proceedings regarding the use of practices violating the 
collective interests of consumers and (2) determining whether a violation of any consumer 
interests being protected by the law occured.
VOL. 2011, 4(5)
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refer to them42. It is common for undertakings to not know officially about the 
existence of explanatory proceedings until an inspection is carried out despite 
the fact that they can lead to competition law charges.The question arises in 
this context whether inspections (controls or searches) can take place during 
explanatory proceedings. An affirmative answer derives from the wording of 
Article 105a(1) of the Competition Act (a control) and Article 105c(1) of the 
Competition Act (a search)43 which provide that an inspection can be carried 
out during any kind of proceedings before the UOKiK President including 
explanatory ones. 
Still, the interpretation of any legal act cannot be limited to a literal 
meaning of its provisions. Article 105a and 105c of the Competition Act read in 
conjunction with Article 48 should be interpreted in the light of the principle of 
proportionality. The use of inspections must thus be excluded in certain kinds 
of explanatory proceedings. Generally speaking, a control and a search can 
be carried out only when the explanatory proceedings may lead to a decision 
being taken by the UOKiK President whether it is likely that a competition 
law violation had occurred44. It is unfounded to consider that the authority 
is entitled to carry out an inspection when the premise of Article 48(1) of 
the Competition Act is not met, in other words, when the UOKiK President 
has no knowledge about circumstances suggesting that Competition Act had 
been infringed. The competence of the competition authority to carry out an 
inspection (both controls and searches) must be excluded in particular with 
respect to explanatory proceedings meant to conduct a market study, including 
the determination of the structure and degree of concentration thereof and 
initially determining whether an obligation exists to submit a notification of 
an intended concentration. Performing an inspection in such cases would have 
the character of a ‘fishing expedition’45 – an inspection that has no factual and 
legal basis suggesting that competition rules could have been infringed.
Concerns arise in this context because controls are carried out primarily 
during explanatory proceedings46 when undertakings have very limited powers 
to oppose unfounded controls. Out of the 26 controls that took place in the 
first half of 2011, 25 occurred during explanatory proceedings, the respective 
42 Such situation was assessed critically by A. Jurkowska, [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, 
D. Miąsik (eds), Ustawa…, art. 48, No 10.
43 A search (if accepted by the court) makes an integral part of a control.
44 Such a conclusion justifies opening of competition law proceedings by raising objections 
against particular undertakings.
45 H. Andersson, E. Legnerfalt, Dawn Raids in Sector Inquiries..., pp. 439–440; A. Jones, 
B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 1061.
46 Some scholars suggest that this is a correct situation – see C. Banasiński, E. Piontek 
(eds), Ustawa…, p. 840 and K. Róziewicz-Ładoń, Postępowanie przed Prezesem Urzędu Ochrony 
Konkurencji i Konsumentów..., p. 213.
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numbers were 23 out of the total of 28 in 2010, 23 out of 29 in 2009 and; 23 
out of 36 in 200847. It is true that controls can often be effective only if carried 
out without a forewarning. They must therefore take place before official 
objections are raised – at the stage of explanatory proceedings. However, the 
presumption for controls to be carried out during explanatory proceedings 
has no legal basis. Respect for proportionality (the use of the least intrusive 
methods possible to establish facts) suggests caution in their use48. A control 
is an instrument that significantly interferes with the freedom of economic 
activity of the inspected undertaking also because the UOKiK President has 
the power to seize items that may constitute evidence in the case [Article 
105g(1) of the Competition Act].
When it comes to searches, their use during explanatory proceedings 
should be even more restrained and primarily concern possible hard-core 
infringements of competition law. The Competition Court should decide on 
authorising a search on a case by case basis rather than by a formal qualification 
of given proceedings as dealing with cartels. The assessment whether a 
search is needed must take into account the fact that it is permissible during 
explanatory proceedings only if a justifiable suspicion exists of a breach of the 
Competition Act, particularly if it is feared that evidence might be obliterated 
(see Article 105c(2) of the Competition Act). As a rule therefore, a search 
should be performed during full competition proceedings rather than in their 
explanatory phase. Statistics of the last two year paint a different picture 
however. Between January and June 2011, the UOKiK President carried out 6 
searches all of which occurred during explanatory proceedings; 5 searches took 
place in 2010 and again, all of them occurred during explanatory proceedings. 
The situation was slightly different in earlier years: 2 out of the 5 searches 
carried out in 2009 took place in explanatory proceedings as did 2 out of the 
3 searches performed in 200849.
The UOKiK President is entitled to carry out a search during explanatory 
proceedings only in situations described in Article 48(2)(1) of the Competition 
Act – explanatory proceedings aiming at an initial determination whether 
an infringement of the Competition Act took place which may justify the 
institution of full competition law proceedings. The authority cannot carry 
out a search in explanatory proceedings described in Article 48(2)(2-5) of 
47 The situation was different in 2007 where only 8 out of the total of 30 controls were 
carried out during explanatory proceedings. This data were obtained from UOKiK in effect of 
the notion for disclosure of public information.
48 R. Janusz, Dostosowywanie prawa polskiego..., p. 294.
49 No searches were carried out in 2007.
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the Competition Act50. The performance of a search is excluded therefore 
in explanatory proceedings meant to conduct a market study including 
the establishment of its competitive structure51. It can be added that the 
UOKiK President does not have, at such an early stage of the investigation, 
justifiable suspicions of a serious infringement of the Competition Act. It is 
also correct to state that conducting a search in concentration proceedings 
would be contrary to the character of these proceedings52. For that reason, 
the provisions of the Competition Act should be interpreted in the light of 
the principle of proportionality and thus exclude the use of searches during 
explanatory proceedings unless the UOKiK President has prior knowledge of 
competition restricting practices.
VII. Right of complaint and judicial control
Procedural safeguards circumscribing the UOKiK President’s inspection 
powers consist of: (1) the right to lodge an objection under the Act on the 
Freedom of Economic Activity; (2) prior judicial control with respect to 
searches and; (3) subsequent judicial control of final decisions issued by the 
competition authority where it is possible to rise procedural objections about 
the way in which the administrative proceedings were conducted.
1. Objections under the Act on the Freedom of Economic Activity
The Act on the Freedom of Economic Activity of 2004 states that an 
undertaking may lodge an objection against the way public administrative 
bodies exercise their inspection rights. Filing such an objection suspends the 
inspection. The administrative body carrying it out has three days to decide 
whether the objections are justified. If the administrative order concerning 
the objections is negative for the company, in other words, if the control 
is to be continued, the undertaking in question can file a complaint to an 
administrative court. 
50 This is also an opinion of B. Turno, ‘Komentarz…’, [in:] A. Stawicki, E. Stawicki E. (eds), 
Ustawa..., p. 1073.
51 See different opinion, [in:] C. Banasiński, E. Piontek (eds), Ustawa…, pp. 869-870.
52 B. Turno, ‘Komentarz…’, [in:] A. Stawicki, E. Stawicki E. (eds), Ustawa..., p. 1073. The 
concentration proceedings shall be deemed civil and not criminal in a light of the Article 6 of 
the ECHR.
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The application of the Act on the Freedom of Economic Activity is very 
limited with respect to competition proceedings. Companies may lodge 
objections on the basis of Article 84c(1) of this Act claiming that a violation 
occurred of its Article 79a(1) and 79a (3)-(9)53. Those subject to an inspection 
may thus complain only on irregularities when it comes to the authorisation 
to carry out a control within competition proceedings. Undertakings may, in 
particular, lodge an objection that the extent of the control being carried out 
is actually broader than that set out in its authorisation.
A company being controlled, Polkomtel S.A., has tried at one point, albeit 
unsuccessfully, to use the above institution to complain also on the lack of 
impartiality of the inspectors and disproportional character of actions taken in 
the framework of the inspection with respect to the object of the explanatory 
proceedings. The undertaking claimed moreover that the contested control 
was run by UOKiK employee without an appropriate authorization. Polkomtel 
alleged in this respect that the inspection was carried out on the basis of an 
authorization issued prior to the initiation of the investigation, and that the 
scope of the control was broader that the object of the proceedings. The 
company noted additionally that the control was carried out outside its normal 
working hours. Polkomtel’s objections were dismissed by the UOKiK President 
as well as the Competition Court54.
2. Prior judicial control
In competition proceedings, prior judicial control over the UOKiK 
President’s powers of inspections is limited to searches only [Article 105c(1) 
of the Competition Act] because a control [Article 105a(1) of the Competition 
Act] is carried out on the basis of a written authorisation issued by the 
authority itself. Companies subject to controls can thus question them only in 
cases prescribed in the Act on the Freedom of Economic Activity or complain 
53 Under the general rules of the Act on the Freedom of Economic Activity, objections may 
refer to the violations of Article 79(1) and 79 (3)-(7), Article 80(1), Article 82(1) and Article 
83(1). These provisions, due to the existence of a clear statutory exemption in this respect, 
are not applicable in the case of proceedings before the UOKiK President. See also B. Turno, 
‘Komentarz…’, [in:] A. Stawicki, E. Stawicki E. (eds), Ustawa..., p. 1156.
54 See the order of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 22 December 
2009, XVII Amz 54/09/A, described in the decision of the UOKiK President of 24 February 2011, 
DOK-1/2011, p. 12. The Court of Competition and Consumer Protection (not an Administrative 
Court) is competent to deal with complaints on orders of the UOKiK President issued as 
aźresult of objections raised under the Act on the Freedom of Economic Activity, see judgment 
of the Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw of 5 March 2010, III SA/Wa 1496/09. See also 
K. Róziewicz-Ładoń, Postępowanie przed Prezesem Urzędu..., pp. 261–262.
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to the Competition Court if the UOKiK President imposes on them a fine for 
their lack of cooperation during a control.
Article 105a(1) and 1051(3) of the Competition Act fails to set out however 
the extent of judicial control over searches carried out by the UOKiK President. 
It provides only that the Competition Court has 48 hours for issuing an order 
authorising a search upon the authority’s request. Lacking legal provisions 
together with problems in distinguishing between a search and a control make 
procedural guarantees unclear in this context. It has been pointed out in the 
jurisprudence of the Polish Constitutional Court that those legal provisions 
which result in a limitation of rights and freedoms must be characterized 
by their non-ambiguity and precision as required by Article 2 of the Polish 
Constitution55. The more far-reaching the limitation in question is, the stronger 
the procedural guarantees shall be to protect them56.
The premises for consenting to a search should be interpreted in a strict 
manner. The Competition Court must decide first whether a reasonable 
basis exists to believe that possible proofs can be found in the premises 
the authority wishes to search (per analogiam Article 219 § 1 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure)57. Proportionality requirements must be taken into 
account next to decide if it is highly likely that the documents, or other items 
the UOKiK President wishes to get hold of, cannot be obtained in a different, 
less intrusive manner (such as a control) or if is suspected that the scrutinised 
undertaking will hide, destroy or alter them. When dealing with a request to 
consent to an exceptional search in explanatory proceedings, the Court has 
to decide also whether a justifiable suspicion exists that the Competition Act 
had actually been violated. It should assess in particular if past misconduct of 
the undertaking the premises of which the authority wishes to search suggests 
that there is an objective risk that evidence will be obliterated58.
55 Judgments of the Constitutional Court: of 22 May 2002, K 6/02, (2002) 3/A OTK ZU sec. 
33 and of 11 January 2000, K 7/99, (2000) 1 OTK ZU sec. 2. See also judgment of ECHR of 16 
February 2000 in case Amann v Switzerland, 27798/95, para. 56.
56 L. Garlicki, ‘Komentarz do art. 31 ust. 3 Konstytucji’, [in:] L. Garlicki (ed.), Konstytucja 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, t. III, Warszawa 2003.; K. Wojtyczek, ‘Zasada 
proporcjonalności’, [in:] B. Banaszak, A. Preisner (ed.), Prawa i wolności obywatelskie 
w Konstytucji RP, Warszawa 2002, p. 667. The judgments of the Constitutional Court: of 12 
January 1999 r., P 2/98, (1999) 1 OTK ZU sec. 2 and of 22 September 2005, Kp 1/05, (2005) 
8/A OTK ZU, sec. 93.
57 The UOKiK President should show in the request concrete informations he/she believes 
can be established by way of a search in given premises, see M. Swora, [in:] T. Skoczny, 
A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds), Ustawa…., Art. 105c, No 9.
58 M. Swora, [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds), Ustawa…., Art. 105c, No 14.
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Article 105c(3) of the Competition Act59 constitutes a negative exception 
from the perspective of the constitutional requirement of a two-instance 
judicial process [Article 78 and Article 176(1) of the Polish Constitution]. 
It specifies that the decision of the Competition Court concerning a search 
cannot be appealed. This happens despite the fact that searches interfere 
significantly with the rights and freedoms of private entities (especially their 
right to privacy). It would be possible to amend the Competition Act so as 
to compromise procedural effectiveness with adequate procedural standards 
by introducing two-instance judicial proceedings and giving the inspected 
undertakings the right to appeal the court order authorising a search at the 
moment of its commencement (such appeal would not have to suspend a 
search). Similar solutions exist in the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure 
(Article 236).
Judicial control over the powers of inspections of the UOKiK President 
cannot be illusory. Statistics put this issue into doubt however since the 
Competition Court has in practice authorised all searches requested by the 
UOKiK President in the last three and a half years (3 in 2008, 5 in 2009, 5 in 
2010 and 6 in the first half of 2011).
3. Subsequent judicial control
According to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, decisions taken by 
administrative bodies which do not satisfy the requirements of Article 6(1) 
ECHR must be subject to subsequent control by a ‘judicial body that has full 
jurisdiction’ over questions of facts and law60. Full jurisdiction means that 
courts must be entitled and actually examine all relevant facts of the case61 
as well as to have the power to quash the appealed administrative decision62 
59 See also M. Swora, [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds), Ustawa…., Art. 105c, 
No 16.
60 Generally see Albert and Le Compte v Belgium, application no. 7299/75, 7496/76, judgment 
of 10 February 1983, para. 29; Gautrin and others v France, application no. 21257/93, judgment of 
20 May 1998, para. 57; Frankowicz v Poland, application no. 53025/99, judgment of 16 December 
2008, para. 60. Specifically for judicial control over administrative bodies see: Bendenoun v. 
France, application no. 12547/86, judgment of 24 February 2004, para. 46; Umlauft v Austria, 
application no. 15527/89, judgment of 23 October 1995, para. 37–39; Schmautzer v Austria, 
application no. 15523/89, judgment of 23 October 1995, para. 34; Janosevic v Sweden, application 
no. 34619/97, judgment of 21 May 2003, para. 81. See also L. Drabek, ‘A Fair Hearing Before 
EC Institutions’ (2001) 4 European Review of Private Law 561; K. Lenaerts, J. Vanhamme, 
‘Procedural Rights of Private Parties in the Community Administrative Process’ (1997) (34) 
CMLR 561-562.
61 Schmautzer v Austria, para. 35.
62 Ibidem, para. 36; Janosevic v Sweden, para. 81.
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in all its aspects (facts and law). When it comes to the assessment of their 
legality, the ECtHR expects the judiciary not to be limited to an assessment 
whether the impugned decision is in line with substantive law63. Courts shall 
also be empowered to set aside an administrative decision in its entirety or 
part, if it is established that procedural requirements of fairness were not met 
in the proceedings which led to its adoption64. The observance of the principle 
of proportionality by the UOKiK President should thus be assessed by the 
Competition Court during appeal proceedings where UOKiK infringement 
decisions are being controlled65. This is an indispensable safeguard as 
inspections are crucial for finding proofs of competition law violations.
Article 77(6) of the Act on the Freedom of Economic Activity states in 
this respect that evidence obtained in violation of legal norms on inspections 
cannot be considered as proof in any administrative proceedings regarding 
the inspected undertaking, provided the violation influenced the results of 
that inspection. EU jurisprudence follows the same line specifying that t he 
illegality of a Commission decision authorizing an inspection (as well as 
its disproportional character) prevents it from using, for the purposes of 
competition law infringement proceedings, any documents or evidence which 
it might have obtained in the course of that investigation66. If that is not the 
case, the final decision on the infringement might be annulled by EU Courts 
in so far as it was based on such evidence67.
The Polish Competition Court should exercise effective control over the 
way in which evidence is collected during inspections (both controls and 
searches). If an infringement of procedural rules is established concerning 
evidence, such as a violation of the principle of proportionality in the course 
of an inspection, the Court should disregard such evidence. In cases where the 
remaining evidence is insufficient to prove a competition law infringement, the 
Court should change the UOKiK decision by not establishing an infringement 
in line with the jurisprudence of the Polish Supreme Court68. The Competition 
63 See Potocka and others v Poland, application no. 33776/96, judgment of 4 October 2001, 
para. 55, 58; Sigma Radio Television Ltd v Cyprus, application no. 32181/04, 35122/05, judgment 
21 July 2011, para. 153–154.
64 Ibidem.
65 With respect to Polish rules governing judicial control over procedural infractions in 
competition proceedings see M. Bernatt, ‘The control of Polish courts over the infringements 
of procedural rules by the national competition authority. Case comment to the judgement 
of the Supreme Court of 19 August 2009 – Marquard Media Polska (No. III SK 5/09)’ (2010) 
3(3) YARS 300–305.
66 C-94/00 Roquette Freres, para. 49; H. Andersson, E. Legnerfalt, Dawn Raids in Sector 
Inquiries..., p. 444.
67 Ibidem.
68 The Supreme Court of 19 August 2009, III SK 5/09, LEX, No. 548862.
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Court is also entitled to quash a decision of the UOKiK President if it is 
establishes that the undertaking in question was deprived of, as a consequence 
of an inspection, the opportunity to defend itself during the proceedings, that 
is, if a violation took place of a requirement indispensable for their validity69.
VIII. Conclusions
Several problems were identified in this article concerning the observance 
of the principle of proportionality when it comes to inspections carried out by 
the Polish competition authority.
The first deals with the lack of clarity in the distinction between two 
inspection powers granted to the UOKiK President – a control and a search. 
It must be accepted that whenever the authority plans to actively look for 
proofs of a competition law breach independently from the representatives 
of the undertaking concerned, it should carry out a search (after obtaining 
judicial authorisation to do so) rather than an ordinary control. Otherwise 
the inspected undertakings will have a reasonable right to question before the 
Competition Court the legality of such control.
Second, unannounced inspections should be an exception rather than 
the rule. There is a need to abolish the general exception provided by the 
Act on the Freedom of Economic Activity which states that undertakings 
are not notified about planned inspections in competition law proceedings. 
Prior knowledge can often undermine the possibility of finding proofs of 
a competition law infringement. This, however, the competition authority 
should decide on a case by case basis. The existence of a general statutory 
exception in this regard brings about the risks that the inspected company’s 
right of defence will be disproportionally limited at least in some cases.
Third, the sake of the principle of proportionality requires a reasonable 
use of controls and an exceptional use of searches in explanatory proceedings. 
The UOKiK President is not entitled to carry out an inspection (controls 
and searches) during explanatory proceedings when the premise of Article 
48(1) of the Competition Act is not met, that is, without a suspected breach 
of the Competition Act. The competences of the UOKiK President in this 
respect must be excluded in particular with respect to explanatory proceedings 
aimed at conducting a market study. Such inspections would amount to a 
69 The Supreme Court in the judgment of 29 April 2009, III SK 8/09, suggested that 
a violation of requirements indispensable for the validity of proceedings can be the ground for 
the revocation of a UOKiK decision. With respect to the consequences of improper inspections 
see also: C. Banasiński, E. Piontek (eds), Ustawa…, pp. 919–920.
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‘fishing expedition’ – an inspection that has no factual and legal basis. The 
Competition Court must exercise caution especially when dealing with 
authorization requests for a search at the stage of explanatory proceedings. 
An approval should be granted only if the UOKiK President has managed 
to shown a justifiable suspicion of a serious infringement of the Competition 
Act and when a reasonable basis exists to believe that possible proofs of 
anticompetitive behaviour can be found in the premises the authority wants 
to search. It must be also borne in mind that a search during explanatory 
proceedings is permissible only if they are aimed at an initial determination 
whether an infringement of the provisions of the Competition Act took place.
Finally, judicial control over the UOKiK President’s powers of inspection 
should be more intensive. The grounds for raising objections under the Act 
on the Freedom of Economic Activity could be broader and refer directly to 
the question of proportionality of inspections. When it comes to prior control 
of searches, the Competition Court must check in detail – on a case by case 
basis – whether carrying out a search is indispensable for finding proofs of the 
competition law violation and whether less intrusive investigative measures 
would not be sufficient. The Court must pay special attention to requests for 
authorising a search in the course of explanatory proceedings. There is also 
a need for an amendment of the Competition Act so as to introduce a two-
instance judicial procedure applicable to search requests submitted by the 
UOKiK President. The right of the inspected undertaking to appeal an order 
of the Competition Court authorizing a search would be better at guaranteeing 
the proportionality of searches. Such an appeal, if not suspensory for a search, 
would not undermine the effectiveness of the investigation. Moreover, the 
Competition Court must consider procedural infractions when controlling 
final infringement decisions issued by the UOKiK President. Thus, the way the 
evidence was collected by the authority must be scrutinised by the judiciary. 
If a violation of procedural rules is established concerning the inspection, or 
indeed a direct violation of the principle of proportionality, the Competition 
Court should disregard such evidence.
The aforementioned problems can be largely solved by changing the 
enforcement practice of the UOKiK President and the approach of the 
Competition Court as well as an alteration of the interpretation of existing 
legal provisions. However, it would be wise for the UOKiK President to use 
works under the mandate of the Competition Policy 2011-2013 program70 
not only to increase the effectiveness of the authority’s investigative powers 
but also to propose new legal solutions for guaranteeing the observance of 
70 Polityka konkurencji na lata 2011–2013, Urząd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów 
[Competition policy in 2011–2013, Office of Competition and Consumer Protection]; available 
only in Polish at http://www.uokik.gov.pl/download.php?plik=10111, pp. 73–74.
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the principle of proportionality in the course of inspections carried out in 
competition law proceedings.
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